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One way that principals can overcome the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations is to enable
whistleblowing.We evaluate how whistleblowing influences compliance in the judicial hierarchy.We present a formal model
in which a potential whistleblower may, at some cost, signal noncompliance by a lower court to a higher court. A key
insight of the model is that whistleblowing is most informative when it is rare. While the presence of a whistleblower can
increase compliance by lower courts, beyond a certain point blowing the whistle is counterproductive and actually reduces
compliance. Moreover, a whistleblower who is a “perfect ally” of the higher court (in terms of preferences) blows the whistle
too often. Our model shows an important connection between the frequency of whistleblowing and the effectiveness of
whistleblowing as a threat to induce compliance in hierarchical organizations.
Apervasive problem in hierarchical organizationsis how principals can oversee agents in the ab-sence of all the information that agents typically
possess (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001). One way
to overcome this problem is to promote the transmission
of information by enabling whistleblowing or fire alarms.
Both individualswithinorganizations andaggrieved third
parties may act as whistleblowers by passing informa-
tion to superiors. For example, McCubbins and Schwartz
(1984) explore Congress’s dilemma in deciding how best
to oversee executive agencies that may choose to imple-
ment policies that differ fromwhat members of Congress
want. Given a choice between patrolling for noncom-
pliance (a “police patrol”) and waiting for third parties
to notify Congress of noncompliance (a “fire alarm”), it
is often more efficient to wait for individual citizens or
interest groups to act as whistleblowers and sound an
alarm.
The question of how best to oversee agents also arises
in the federal judicial hierarchy. Appellate courts with dis-
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1While Supreme Court justices can send signals to lower courts, litigants, and interest groups about particular issues they would like to
hear, the justices still must rely on other actors to bring them cases.
cretionary dockets have the ability to choose which cases
to review—with this power, higher courts can reverse de-
cisions by lower courts that they disagree with. Because
judicial decisions are the outlet for judicial power, the
ability to oversee and reverse subordinates in the judicial
hierarchy is a keymechanism for ensuring greater compli-
ance and uniformity in the law (Kornhauser 1995). With
this discretion, however, comes the difficulty of deciding
which cases to select for review. Because American courts
are tasked with judging only cases or controversies that
come to them, it is difficult for them to conduct police
patrols. Instead of seeking out disputes, courts must wait
for cases to come to them.1 Accordingly, higher courts
must rely on “fire alarms” to select the few worthy cases
to review. Litigant appeals serve as a form of fire alarms,
given thatmany litigants will appeal a decision to a higher
court if they believe that it is incorrect. In addition, ex-
ternal actors (i.e., those not directly involved in a legal
dispute) also can sound fire alarms. These include judges
on lower courts whowrite dissenting opinions targeted at
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higher courts, interest groups that file amici briefs asking
a higher court to correct what they perceive as mistakes
by a lower court, and a request by the solicitor general for
the Supreme Court to hear a case.
It is well established that higher courts aremore likely
to review cases when any of these fire alarms have been
sounded—in other words, that the Supreme Court re-
lies on cues that suggest a case is worthy of review. The
presence of a dissent on a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals is correlated with the probability that a
circuit court will review a panel decision en banc (George
1999; Giles,Walker, andZorn 2006) and that the Supreme
Court will review the case (Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn
1999; Perry 1991; Tanenhaus et al. 1963). Cases in which
an amicus brief is filed are more likely to be reviewed by
the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Wright 1988). Finally,
the Court is more likely to take cases when the solicitor
general suggests review, since her selective involvement
indicates that a case is important (Bailey, Kamoie, and
Maltzman 2005). But the mechanisms by which this in-
formation is useful to a higher court—and the incentives
those mechanisms create for lower court judges—have
been underexplored. If whistles increase the probability
of higher court review, why don’t lower court judges pre-
empt them ex ante by accommodating potential whistle-
blowers? Similarly, why do some legal actors have more
influence on the Supreme Court’s case selection than
others?
In this article, we present a formal model that eval-
uates how whistleblowing influences decision making in
the judicial hierarchy. In our model, a lower court ini-
tially hears a case and decides whether to rule in a man-
ner compliant with a higher court’s known preferences.
A potential whistleblower—which may represent a judge
or a third party—then decides whether to send a costly
public signal (i.e., to “blow the whistle”) in the form of a
dissent, an appeal, or a petition. The case then moves to
a higher court, which observes the lower court’s decision
as well as this public signal if it is sent, but not the specific
case facts. The higher court can then choose to review the
case, learn the case facts, and potentially reverse the lower
court’s ruling. However, there is a cost to review, and
this cost is initially unknown to the other players. Impor-
tantly, we consider whistleblowers who are motivated by
the desire to see case outcomes with which they disagree
overturned. Moreover, because the higher court learns
the facts upon review, the whistleblower never blows the
whistle when the higher court would uphold the major-
ity’s decision; thus, the whistleblower is always truthful.
As a result, our model focuses on how to maximize the
informativeness of these truthful signals.
Themain results of themodel are as follows. First, the
presence of a potential whistleblower—and the associated
threat of blowing the whistle—can increase compliance
ex ante, by causing the lower court to vote against its
preferred outcome more than it would in the absence of
such awhistleblower. In such instances, the whistleblower
has no need to blow the whistle.
Second, there is a limit on the extent to which the
threat of whistleblowing can effectuate compliance by
the lower court; it can never compel the lower court to
fully comply in all cases. The reason is simply that the
higher court’s review time is costly. Because of this, there
are always cases where the lower court cares sufficiently
about the outcome—and the higher court cares suffi-
ciently little, compared to the cost of review—that the
lower court is willing to risk review and reversal by ruling
noncompliantly.
Third, and most surprisingly, if the whistleblower
chooses to blow the whistle on cases beyond this
limit, then in equilibrium there is a “kickback” effect—
compliance by the lower court is actually reduced. The
reason for this effect follows from a fundamental prop-
erty of whistleblowing—it is most effective for inducing
the higher court to review a case when it is rare. We for-
mally demonstrate how blowing the whistle more often
reduces its informational value to the higher court, which
in turn diminishes the likelihood that blowing the whis-
tle will trigger review. The surprising equilibrium effect
of this property is that blowing the whistle too much
will eventually diminish the effectiveness of the threat of
whistleblowing so much that the lower court will actually
comply less than it would if the whistle were blown less
frequently.
An important additional implication of this prop-
erty is that compliance by the lower court is maximized
with intermediate whistleblowing—whistles that occur
frequently enough that the lower court complies in many
cases where it would not in the absence of a potential
whistleblower, but not so often that blowing the whistle
loses its informative value. When intermediate whistle-
blowing holds, blowing the whistle is used as a threat to
constrain the lower court from engaging in more severe
instances of noncompliance, but whistleblowing does not
occur so often that the effectiveness of that threat is ex-
cessively diminished.
This “limit to compliance” generates a number of
surprising implications and comparative statics. First,
with respect to review, the signals of legal actors who
are intrinsically more willing to blow the whistle—either
because they are ideologically distant from the lower
court or because blowing the whistle is less costly for
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them—will be less effective at inducing review. Second,
with respect to compliance, the preferences of whistle-
blowers have a non-monotonic effect—their willingness
to blow the whistle first increases compliance by the
lower court, but eventually decreases compliance as more
extreme whistleblowers become too willing to blow the
whistle. Relatedly, the higher court does not benefit from
having a “perfect ally” in the sense of a whistleblower
who perfectly shares its preferences. In fact, even a perfect
ally whose costs and benefits are perfectly aligned with
the higher court blows the whistle too often. The reason
is that the decision to blow the whistle is driven by the
immediate costs and benefits, and the whistleblower does
not internalize the negative informational consequences
of blowing the whistle too often.
In its focus on compliance, the model necessarily has
a number of limitations. First, we focus on caseswhere the
existing law is clear; thus, we ask how the dispositions is-
sued by lower courts comply with the known preferences
of a higher court, and focus on blowing the whistle solely
as a signal about case facts. The incentives we studymight
look different in a model of law creation, where a higher
court’s preferences are either unknown or unformed (see,
e.g., Baker andMezzetti 2012; Carrubba and Clark 2012),
and consequently, lower courts have much more discre-
tion in their decision making. Second, our model does
not consider how the potential for dissent may influence
bargaining on appellate courts over choices that are not
binary, such as the content of a legal rule (Cameron and
Kornhauser 2010; Carrubba et al. 2012). In these situ-
ations, majorities and potential dissenting judges might
compromise on moderate decisions.
Our model contributes to a growing literature on
the incidence and effects of whistleblowing in insti-
tutions (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2008; Epstein
and O’Halloran 1995; Hopenhayn and Lohmann 1996;
Lupia and McCubbins 1994; Prendergast 2003; Ting
2008). In several of thesemodels, however, the presence of
awhistle is assumed; by contrast, we allow it to emerge en-
dogenously. Moreover, while most of these studies have
emphasized the ex post effects of whistleblowing—that
is, how whistleblowers can inform superiors of possible
noncompliance or mismanagement by an agent—our
model clarifies the importance of the ex ante effect of
whistleblowing. In this sense, our article complements
themodel of stovepiping presented inGailmard and Patty
(2013), which shows that the presence of a whistleblower
can induce an agent to transmit information to the princi-
pal that she otherwise would not. Our evaluation of both
the ex ante and ex post effects ofwhistleblowing also corre-
sponds to the recent literatureon lawsdesigned to increase
the oversight of cartels by granting leniency to members
who blow thewhistle on othermembers (Spagnolo 2008).
Such laws have both an ex ante cartel-deterrence effect
and an ex post cartel-detection effect (Miller 2009). Fi-
nally, our result that intermediate whistleblowing is most
effective in inducing compliance dovetails with themodel
in Taka´ts (2011), which shows that intermediate fines for
banks that fail to report suspicious transactions are most
effective in curtailing money laundering.
From the perspective of judicial politics, the notion
of judicial whistleblowing was introduced by Cross and
Tiller (1998), who found that judges on three-judge pan-
els tended to votedifferently dependingon thepreferences
of their colleagues in a given case. Since then, scholars have
extensively studied the phenomenon of “panel effects,” in
which the propensity of a judge on a three-judge panel to
vote liberally increases with every Democratic appointee
she sits with, and vice versa (Revesz 1997; Sunstein et al.
2006). This literature has been largely empirical, although
there have been a few theoretical exceptions (Fischman
2011; Kastellec 2007; Spitzer and Talley 2013). Ourmodel
provides further theoretical foundations for understand-
ing panel effects on the Court of Appeals.
Our model also complements existing work on the
judicial hierarchy more generally. Early models of the
hierarchy evaluated courts on each level of the hierar-
chy as unitary actors (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000;
McNollgast 1994; Spitzer and Talley 2000). Lax (2003)
considered amultimember SupremeCourt to understand
the effect of the “Rule of 4” on the Supreme Court’s in-
teractions with the lower courts. The model in Kastel-
lec (2007), upon which our model is built, maintained
a unitary Supreme Court but introduced a two-player
lower court in order to understand the relationship be-
tween panel effects and compliance. Whereas in Kastellec
(2007) the threat of dissent was at times sufficient to in-
duce full compliance by a lower court, the equilibrium
behavior in the current model is more nuanced. Finally,
our model shares some similarities with the theory pre-
sented in Daughety and Reinganum (2006). They do not
focus on issues of compliance, but like our model they
consider the role of dissent in providing information to a
higher court.
TheModel
Players and Cases. There are three players in the model:
a higher court H , a lower court L , and a potential whistle-
blower (henceforth simply “whistleblower”)W. L repre-
sents amajority bloc of judges, whowe assumebehave as a
unitary actor.W represents an actor outside this majority
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who has the potential to issue a costly signal in the formof
a dissent.W can represent a single judge on a three-judge
panel, with L representing a two-judge majority. W can
also represent an interest group filing an amicus brief or
the solicitor general requesting the Court to hear a case.
For ease of exposition, when there is a potential for pro-
noun confusion, we refer to H as “he,” L as “they,” and
W as “she.”
The play of the game determines the outcome of a
case. The facts of the case map onto a unidimensional
space X that determines the degree to which the liberal
outcome is more appropriate; x denotes the case’s
location on X. Facts that fall to the right are more
“liberal.” The court makes either a “liberal” or “conser-
vative” decision, denoted by lib and con, respectively. For
example, Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000), Lax (2003),
and Kastellec (2007) all describe the case space in terms
of search-and-seizure cases. In those models, the case
space represents the degree of intrusiveness of a search,
where cases that fall to the right are more intrusive. In
terms of outcomes, a search is either held reasonable (the
“conservative” outcome) or unreasonable (the “liberal”
outcome).
Preferences andUtility. Theplayers care about case out-
comes, and their preferences are described by an indiffer-
ence point in the case space.With slight abuse of notation,
we denote the players’ indifference points by L , W, and
H . Each player prefers that all cases that map to the right
of this indifference point receive the liberal outcome, and
all to the left receive the conservative outcome. A player
derives linear utility from thedispositional outcome: Each
receives i−x2 from a ruling of con and
x−i
2 from a ruling of
l ib, where i denotes each player’s respective indifference
points. Thus, when x < i , the player prefers a ruling of
con; when x > i , the player prefers l ib. The loss from
an incorrect decision is |x − i |. An indifference point can
be thought of as a description of the player’s ideal legal
outcome for every case.2 To simplify the presentation,
we assume throughout that L and H are located within
[0, 1], and in addition that the lower court is more liberal
than the higher court (i.e., L < H). However, the results
are symmetric: they continue to hold if one makes L
more conservative than H and then transposes “liberal”
for “conservative.”
Sequence of Play. Nature first randomly draws a set
of case facts x distributed according to the cumulative
2This conception of utility can comprise both legalistic andpolitical
goals, such as wanting to implement good law or pleasing external
actors, like politicians who were responsible for a judge coming to
the bench.
distribution function F (x). F (x) is assumed to be uni-
formly distributed on [0, x], where x ≥ 1. L andW then
observe x , which is revealed to the lower court judges
and interested parties as the case is presented in briefs
and oral arguments. L decides whether to rule liberally
or conservatively. After observing this choice, W decides
whether to blow the whistle in the form of a public signal
of cost d ≥ 0. For ease of exposition, we refer to this sig-
nal as a “dissent” from this point forward; readers should
bear in mind we mean dissent to encompass all types
of fire alarms, including those from non-judges. Both L
and W know the higher court’s preferences H , but they
do not know how much it would cost H to review L ’s
decision.
The case then moves to H , who does not initially ob-
serve the case facts. However, he updates his prior beliefs
based on the observable actions of L andW—specifically,
L ’s disposition of the case, and whether W issued a dis-
sent. This captures the informational asymmetry between
a lower court that actually hears a case, and a higher court
with a discretionary docket that initially has only lim-
ited information. H then decides whether to review and
potentially reverse L ’s ruling. Since a review entails re-
hearing the case, we assume that H learns the case facts x
upon review and, in addition, pays a cost k. This cost cap-
tures both the time and resources a higher court must put
into reviewing a case and the opportunity cost of hear-
ing that case. Upon observing x , the higher court then
makes a final decision of whether to uphold or reverse L ’s
ruling.
TheCost ofReview. H ’s cost of review k is assumed to be
probabilistic and distributed according to a CDF G(k),
where G(k) is a uniform distribution over [0, k¯] with
k¯ ≥ 1. This cost is known to H when he decides whether
to review, but it is initially unknown to both L and W.
Substantively, L and W are uncertain about exactly how
much H cares about getting the right disposition relative
to the costs of hearing the case. Thus, they always entertain
the possibility that H will choose not to review simply
because his costs are too high. This uncertainty creates
the possibility that L may rule noncompliantly despite
knowing that she will trigger a dissent and raise the risk
of review. We also allow k¯ to vary, thus allowing L andW
to be more or less unsure of the cost to H of taking the
case. Thus, paired with H ’s initial uncertainty over x , we
assume a two-way informational asymmetry.
The Cost of Reversal. Finally, we assume that costs ac-
crue to L and W if L ’s initial ruling is reversed by H . If
a reversal occurs, then L suffers a sanctioning cost ε > 0.
This cost could capture, for example, the reputational
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penalty that a judge incurs when he is reversed. When L
is reversed, W is also assumed to suffer a cost ε. Infor-
mally,  captures the extent to which W’s fate is linked
to L ’s. On a three-judge panel where W represents a sin-
gle judge, we argue that  is positive due to the fact that
some costs of reversal fall on the entire court. Such costs
include the cost of having to rehear a case on remand,
and the court’s general reputational cost. For third par-
ties like litigants and interest groups,  could be low or
even 0.3 Thus, to dissent,W must be sufficiently opposed
to the disposition to be willing to bear the costs of both
dissenting and of being linked to L ’s reversal.
Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we begin characterizing perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the model. In our analysis, we restrict
attention to equilibriawhere a costly signal by thewhistle-
blower increases the probability of review because it in-
forms the higher court that relatively more severe non-
compliance occurred. For clarity, in the remainder of the
article we refer to this class of equilibria as simply the
“equilibria.”4
At the most general level,W creates a potential prob-
lem for L and a potential benefit for H (though there
are certain scenarios, as we discuss, where the presence
of W does not materially affect the play of the game).
L must worry about whether W will dissent from a
noncompliant decision. H , in turn, can use both the pres-
ence of a dissent, and the incentives created by the threat
therein, to update his beliefs both about the likelihood
that L is not complying and the severity of the possible
noncompliance.
Before moving to the analysis, we foreshadow the
general form of the equilibria. In theory, the form of each
player’s strategy could be complex; L must choose a rul-
ing for every possible case fact, W must choose whether
to dissent for every potential case fact and ruling, and H
3We do not rule out the possibility that  < 0, in which case the
whistleblower benefits when L is reversed irrespective of her pol-
icy preferences. However, we argue that within most institutions,
 ≥ 0.
4As in most signaling models, there sometimes also exist equilibria
where themeaningof the costly signal is reversed. In such equilibria,
a dissent signals that noncompliance occurred but was minor and
reduces theprobabilityof review,whereas the lackof adissent signals
that the ruling was either severely noncompliant or fully compliant
(with more weight on the former), and raises the probability of
review. These “reversed” equilibria are not always present, and
we omit consideration from the main text (see the supporting
information for details). As we show in Proposition 2, equilibria of
the class we consider always exist.
must decidewhether to review following every observable
history of rulings and dissents. However, despite this po-
tential complexity, all equilibria (in the class we consider)
take the following simple and easily interpretable form.
All proofs are gathered in the supporting information.
Lemma 1. All equilibria can be described by cut-
points (c∗L , c
∗
W,
∗
nd ,
∗
d ), where c
∗
L ∈ [L , H] and c∗W <
min{W, H}. Each of L ’s and W’s actions in equilibrium
depend on whether the case facts fall to the left or right of
their respective cutpoints. H’s action—his choice of whether
to review—depends on whether his cost of review falls above
or below some threshold, the value of which is determined
by whether or not W dissents. Specifically,
1. The lower court L rules liberally for x ≥ c∗L and
conservatively otherwise. When x ∈ [c∗L , H], this
ruling is noncompliant.
2. The potential whistleblower W never dissents fol-
lowing a conservative ruling, and dissents follow-
ing a liberal ruling when the facts are sufficiently
conservative (x ≤ c∗W).
3. The higher court H never reviews conservative rul-
ings, and sometimes reviews liberal rulings. Specif-
ically, he reviews a liberal ruling i.f.f. k ≤ ∗d when
W dissents, and i.f.f. k ≤ ∗nd < ∗d when W does
not dissent.
The form of the equilibria is depicted in Figure 1;
for reference, we label the four key regions and refer to
them below in the text. The structure of every equilib-
rium is summarized by four quantities (c∗L , c
∗
W,
∗
nd ,
∗
d ).
The lower court L rules conservatively when the facts are
sufficiently conservative (Region 1, where x ≤ c∗L ) and
liberally otherwise (Regions 2–4, where x ≥ c∗L ). When
x ∈ [L , c∗L ] (Region 1), their policy preferences would
lead them to rule liberally, but they choose to comply
with the higher court’s preferences and rule conserva-
tively. When x ∈ [c∗L , H] (Regions 2 and 3), they choose
to rule liberally, thus issuing a noncompliant decision.
In those noncompliant rulings where the facts are
most conservative (Region 2, where x ∈ [c∗L , c∗W]), the
whistleblower dissents. This informs the higher court that
noncompliancehasoccurred andprovides some informa-
tion about its severity, thereby incentivizing him to review
whenever the cost of review k is less than the threshold∗d .
Finally, for the remainder of rulings where the noncom-
pliance is less severe (Region 3; i.e., x ∈ [c∗W, H]), the
whistleblower does not report it. This silence leaves H
uncertain about whether the ruling involved less severe
noncompliance (i.e., the case is in Region 3) or was ac-
tually compliant (i.e., the case is in Region 4). He thus
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FIGURE 1 Summary of Actions in Equilibrium
Actions in Equilibrium
Actions
Region
W 's actions
L 's actions
H 's actions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Don't dissent
Con
(comply)
Don't review
Dissent
Lib
(Don't comply)
Review with
probability G(φd);
Don't dissent
Lib
(Don't comply)
Review with prob. G(φnd) <G(φd);
Don't dissent
Lib
(Comply, agreement)
L CL
* CW
* H
x
reviews only when the cost k is below some lower thresh-
old ∗nd < 
∗
d .
Before proceeding with the analysis, we emphasize
that a player’s strategy should not be interpreted as
“choosing a cutpoint.” Rather, at the moment that each
player makes their decision, they choose an optimal ac-
tion given the observable history and their expectations
about the other players’ actions. The fact that these ac-
tions can be described by cutpoints is a consequence of
equilibrium, not an assumption about the strategy space.
For example, thewhistleblower decideswhether to dissent
after observing the realization of the case facts x and L ’s
ruling of l ib or con. She does so based on her fixed expec-
tations about the probability that dissenting will trigger
a review, derived from the higher court’s strategy. These
incentives imply that her best responses can be described
by a cutpoint cW separating the liberal rulings on which
she would dissent from those on which she would not.
To characterize how these equilibrium cutpoints are
jointly determined, we proceed as follows. In the remain-
der of this section, we characterize each player’s best re-
sponses as a functionof theothers’ strategies; this provides
intuition for the basic incentives underlying equilibrium.
In the subsequent section, we characterize equilibria, dis-
cuss important properties, and present our main results.
The Value of Review to the Higher Court
We begin by examining the higher court’s review decision
conditional on L ’s and W’s strategies and actions. H
assesses the value of review by observing the ruling and
whether W dissented, and then he updates his beliefs
about the case facts based on L ’s and W’s strategies and
actions. In equilibrium, his review cutpoints ∗d and 
∗
nd
must equal these assessments.
AConservative Ruling. For strategy profiles of the form
in Lemma 1, H ’s assessment of the benefit of reviewing a
conservative ruling is straightforward to compute: there is
none. Since L is more liberal than H , any case on which
L is willing to rule conservatively (x < c L ) is also one
for which H would prefer a conservative ruling (x < H).
This is the “Nixon goes to China” result established in
Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000)—if a more extreme
lower court reaches a conclusion that goes against the
direction of their (relative) ideological bias, the higher
court can be sure he would rule the same. Thus, H ’s best
response is to not review any conservative rulings. Recall
that the results are symmetric: a more liberal H responds
identically to liberal decisions by a more conservative L .
A Liberal Ruling Accompanied by a Dissent. While H
always agrees with L ’s conservative decisions, he may
not always agree with L ’s liberal decisions. After liberal
decisions, H ’s inferences are as follows. Consider first
when L makes a liberal ruling that is accompanied by a
dissent from W. In this circumstance, H can infer that
the case facts are in [c L , cW].5 Intuitively, H knows that
noncompliance occurred and that it was relatively severe,
but he does not know the precise severity. Were he to
review the case and learn the facts, he expects he would
reverse the decision for sure and gain utility H − x (recall
5When cW < c L , dissent is off-path and we must specify beliefs. To
preserve continuity, we assume that H believesW to have deviated
from her strategy by dissenting when the case facts were precisely
at c L .
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that the utility from an incorrect decision is − H−x2 and
from a correct one is H−x2 ). His expected utility gain from
review is therefore
d(c L , cW ; H, F (·)) = H − E [x | x ∈ [c L , cW]], (1)
or the difference between his indifference point and the
expected case facts, conditional on x being in [c L , cW].6
A best response by H thus requires that he review a liberal
ruling accompanied by a dissent if and only if his realized
cost k is less than d(c L , cW ; H, F (·)).
A Liberal Ruling Without a Dissent. When L rules lib-
erally but W does not dissent, H must consider both
the possibility that less severe noncompliance occurred
(x ∈ [cW, H]) and that the case facts were sufficiently
liberal that the ruling was actually compliant (x > H). If
L indeed failed to comply, then as before H ’s gain from
review is H − x , since he would discover the noncompli-
ance upon review and reverse the ruling. However, if the
rulingwas actually compliant, then upon review H would
make no change to the disposition; the gain from review
would be 0 but hewould have paid the cost k of reviewing.
His expected utility gain from review is therefore:
nd(c L , cW ; H, F (·)) = P (x ∈ [cW, H] | x > cW)
·(H − E [x | x ∈ [cW, H]]).
(2)
As before, a best response by H requires that he review a
liberal ruling unaccompanied by a dissent if and only if
his cost k is less than nd(c L , cW, H, F (·)).7
The Effectiveness of Dissent. The effect of dissent on the
higher court’s beliefs is both to raise the probability that
noncompliance occurred from P (x ∈ [cW, H] | x > cW)
to 1, and to shift the possible case facts to the left from
the interval [cW, H] to the interval [c L , cW]. Together,
these updates increase the court’s expected gain to review
from nd(·) to d(·). However, because the higher court’s
opportunity cost of review is probabilistic and unknown
to L and W, this increase does not generate review with
certainty. Instead, it increases the likelihood of review
from G(nd(c L , cW ; ·)) to G(d(c L , cW ; ·)); in particu-
lar, when nd(c L , cW ; ·) < k < d(c L , cW ; ·), H will only
review if there is a dissent. Moreover, although dissent al-
ways increases the probability of review, the exact increase
depends on the frequency of dissent (i.e. the locationof cW)
6Given our assumption about off-path beliefs, the general ex-
pression to account for cW < c L requires simply substituting
max{cW, c L } for cW .
7Again, to account for the case of cW < c L , substitute max{cW, c L }
for cW .
via its influence on H ’s beliefs about the expected gain
from review.
An important feature of the model is that dissent-
ing on a larger set of cases (i.e., a higher cW) reduces
the likelihood of review following a dissent. The reason
is this: although W dissents only when noncompliance
has actually occurred, she could be dissenting on a wider
set of cases, including some with relatively mild non-
compliance, or only on a narrow set of cases with rel-
atively severe noncompliance. When W dissents more,
the higher court’s expected gain from review following
dissentd(c L , cW ; ·) = H − E [x | x ∈ [c L , cW]] is lower
because the additional cases on whichW is dissenting are
those for which the noncompliance is least severe. This
translates into a lower equilibrium probability of review
following dissent. We summarize these results in the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 2. In a best response, the higher court
 never reviews a conservative ruling;
 reviews a liberal ruling with a dissent i.f.f.
k < d(c L , cW ; ·);
 reviews a liberal ruling without a dissent i.f.f.
k < nd(c L , cW ; ·) < d(c L , cW ; ·).
Moreover, the higher court’s probability of review follow-
ing a dissent G(d(c L , cW ; ·)) is strictly decreasing in the
whistleblower’s dissent cutpoint cW.
The Benefits of Dissent to theWhistleblower
We now consider the incentives of the whistleblower. In
our model, the whistleblower dissents to persuade the
higher court to review and reverse a noncompliant liberal
ruling. Consequently, she will never dissent from a liberal
ruling on cases x ≥ H where the higher court also prefers
the liberal disposition, since he will never reverse them.
On cases where the higher court would reverse a liberal
ruling upon review (x < H), the whistleblower would
realize a net gain of (W − x) − ε if she succeeded in
inducing a review; this is the utility gain from reversing
a noncompliant liberal disposition, less W’s share of the
sanctioning cost that falls on the lower court upon re-
versal. W’s dissent will succeed in inducing a review that
would otherwise have not occurred when k ∈ [nd ,d],
that is, when the higher court’s cost of review falls be-
tween his threshold for reviewing a liberal ruling absent a
dissent andwith a dissent. Thus,W will find it worthwhile
to dissent when
((W − x) − ε) · (G(d) − G(nd)) > d, (3)
which generates the following best response behavior:
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Lemma 3. When d > nd , the whistleblower’s best re-
sponse is to dissent if and only if x < min{cW(d ,nd ;
W, d,), H}, where
cW(d ,nd ;W, d,) = (W − ε)
− d
G(d) − G(nd)
(4)
The whistleblower’s dissent behavior in a best
response therefore takes the form of a cutpoint
min{cW(d ,nd ;W, d,), H} that has intuitive proper-
ties. First, it increases (i.e., leads to more dissents) both
as W becomes more conservative and as the probability
that dissent is pivotal G(d) − G(nd) increases. Second,
it decreases (i.e., leads to fewer dissents) both asW ’s share
of the reversal sanction  rises, and as the cost of dissent
d grows.
The Risk of Review to the Lower Court
Finally, we examine the calculus of the lower court. For L ,
the benefit of noncompliance on a case x ∈ [L , H] is ob-
taining the liberal outcome. The cost is the risk of review,
which reverses this outcome and generates a sanction of
cost ε. A key component of their decision is therefore
the likelihood of review. If this were some fixed prob-
ability q , then the gain from noncompliance would be
(1 − q) · (x − L ) (the probability of no review times the
gain from a liberal ruling), and the cost would be q · ε
(the probability of review times the sanctioning cost). In
a best response, L would rule noncompliantly whenever
x is greater than
x∗(q ; L , ε) = L + ε
(
q
1 − q
)
. (5)
This function is increasing in q ; the lower court would
comply more with the preferences of the higher court
when the probability of review is higher.
However, the probability of review of a liberal dispo-
sition is not fixed; it is determined by the whistleblower’s
dissent behavior. Specifically, the probability of review is
G(d) on those cases where the whistleblower would dis-
sent (x < cW), andG(nd) < G(d)on those caseswhere
the whistleblower would not dissent (x > cW). Hence,
from the perspective of the lower court, the case space
can be divided into three regions, as shown in Figure 2:
 Region A: cases x < x∗(G(nd); ·), on which the
facts are sufficiently conservative that L prefers
to comply regardless of whether W will dissent;
 Region B: cases x ∈ [x∗(G(nd); ·),
x∗(G(d); ·)] on which the case facts are
FIGURE 2 L ′s Best Response
L 's best response
x*(G(φnd)) x*(G(φd))
Region A
L prefers to comply
regardless of whether
W will dissent
Region B
L prefers to comply
if and only if
W will dissent
Region C
L prefers to rule
liberally even if 
W will dissent
Case facts x
L
intermediate and L prefers to comply only if
they expect noncompliance to trigger a dissent;
 Region C: cases x > x∗(G(d); ·) on which the
case facts are sufficiently liberal that L prefers to
rule liberally even if W will dissent.
The middle region (Region B) comprises the set of cases
on which the whistleblower’s threat of dissent can in-
duce compliance by L . Outside of this region, the lower
court prefers to either comply (Region A) or risk reversal
(Region C) regardless of whether the whistleblower will
dissent. Consequently, the lower court’s best-response be-
havior is as follows.
Lemma 4. In a best response, the lower court L uses the
cutpoint 8
c L (cW,d ,nd ; L , ε)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗ (G (nd) ; ·) if cW < x∗ (G (nd) ; ·)
cW if cW ∈ [x∗ (G (nd) ; ·) ,
x∗ (G (d) ; ·)]
x∗ (G (d) ; ·) if cW > x∗ (G (d) ; ·)
(6)
Properties of Equilibria
We now characterize equilibria of the model and present
our main results. Formally, an equilibrium requires that
the higher court, whistleblower, and lower court be jointly
best-responding to each other’s strategies. That is,
Lemma5. Cutpoints (c∗L , c
∗
W,
∗
nd ,
∗
d ) are an equilibrium
i.f.f. they satisfy Lemmas 2–4.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a more
precise characterization of the equilibria by solving for
8Equation (6)may bewrittenmore succinctly as c L (cW,d ,nd) =
min{H, x∗(G(d)),max{x∗(G(nd)), cW}}. Note that there is also
an upper bound H , since L will never rule conservatively on a case
where H prefers the liberal ruling.
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cutpoints that jointly satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions. In doing so, we describe equilibrium patterns
of behavior and derive comparative statics. To identify
these cutpoints, we proceed in two steps. First, we fix the
whistleblower’s cutpoint cW and characterize how that
fixed level of dissent affects the equilibrium incentives of
the lower and higher courts. Formally, we characterize
the unique partial equilibrium level of compliance by the
lower court c∗L (cW) when it and the higher court are
jointly best-responding to each other and to cW . Second,
weuse this characterization to solve for equilibriumvalues
of the whistleblower’s dissent cutpoint c∗W .
The Limits to Dissent
To characterize how the whistleblower’s cutpoint cW af-
fects the lower court’s equilibrium level of compliance
c∗L (cW), we employ two benchmark results. Both bench-
marks consider a two-player game played only between
the lower and higher courts. In the first, the higher court
has no information about the case facts (as in the main
model). In the second, the higher court has complete in-
formation about the case facts. Since the function of the
whistleblower is to provide the higher court with infor-
mation about the case facts, these benchmarks allow us
to understand her contribution to the informational and
strategic environment.
In the no information benchmark, H reviews solely
on the basis of his beliefs about how much the lower
court is complying with his preferences. In this game
(as in the main model), L complies if and only if
the case facts fall below some equilibrium cutpoint,
which we denote c L . This cutpoint is defined by the
equality c L = x∗(G(nd(c L , c L ; ·)); ·) because the higher
court’s beliefs about the benefits of review absent the
whistleblower are equal to what her beliefs nd(c L , c L )
would be in the presence of a whistleblower who never
dissents.
In the complete information benchmark, the higher
court already knows the case facts and does not need
to review to learn them; thus, the only purpose of re-
view is to provide the opportunity to reverse a rul-
ing known to be noncompliant. Again, L ’s decision
to comply is based on an equilibrium cutpoint, which
we denote c L . This cutpoint is defined by the equality
c L = x∗(G(d(c L , c L ; ·)); ·) = x∗(G(H − c L )), because
when the whistleblower uses cutpoint cW = c L , a dis-
sent perfectly reveals that the case facts are exactly at
x = c L .
We can now use these two benchmarks to identify the
whistleblower’s contribution to the strategic environment
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The lower and higher court’s joint best-
response behavior as a function of thewhistleblower’s dissent
cutpoint cW is characterized by three nonempty regions
defined by the cutpoints c L < c L , which are both strictly
interior to (L , H).
 Region I (cW < c L ): The lower court is unaf-
fected by the threat of dissent and sets compli-
ance at c∗L (cW) = c L . The degree of compliance is
constant, the probability of dissent is zero, and
the probability of review following a dissent is
constant.
 Region II (cW ∈ [c L , c L ]): The lower court com-
plies just enough to avoid dissent by setting
c∗L (cW) = cW. The degree of compliance is in-
creasing, the probability of dissent is zero, and
the probability of review following a dissent is
decreasing.
 Region III (cW > c L ): The lower court is par-
tially affected by the threat of dissent and solves
c L = x∗(G(d(c L , cW ; ·))). The degree of com-
pliance is decreasing, the probability of dissent is
increasing, and the probability of review following
a dissent is decreasing.9
The three panels in Figure 3 depict the effect of the
whistleblower’s dissent cutpoint cW on equilibrium levels
of compliance, dissent, and review behavior. Specifically,
Figure 3A shows its effect on L ’s equilibrium compliance
c∗L (cW); Figure 3B shows its effect on W’s probability
of dissent F (max{cW, c∗L (cW)}) − F (c∗L (cW)); and Fig-
ure 3C depicts its effect on H ’s probability of review after
dissent G(d(c∗L (cW), cW ; ·)).
There are three key regions, separated by the cut-
points c L and c L from the two benchmarks. Beginning
with L ’s compliance behavior, in the leftmost region (Re-
gion I, cW < c L ) there are no whistleblower effects on
compliance by the lower court—it complies to the same
degree it would absent the whistleblower in the no infor-
mation benchmark. The reason is that all cases on which
the whistleblower would dissent (x < cW) are also ones
where the lower court would comply absent the threat of
dissent (x < c L ). Consequently, in this region the proba-
bility of dissent is zero and the probability of review after
a dissent is constant.10
In sharp contrast, the middle region (Region II,
cW ∈ [c L , c L ]) exhibits full whistleblower effects. Here, the
lower court avoids dissent by complying exactly on those
cases (x < cW) onwhich thewhistleblowerwoulddissent.
9This proposition does not require either F (·) or G(·) to be uni-
form.
10Recall that H ’s off-path beliefs when a dissent is observed off-path
is x = c L .
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FIGURE 3 The Effect of theWhistleblower’s Dissent Cutpoint cW on (A) Compliance, (B)
Dissenting, and (C) Review Behavior
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Note: In each panel, Regions I and II are separated by c L , which is the cutpoint that the lower court would use if the
higher court had no information about the case facts (in a game played just between L and H), and Regions II and
III are separated by c L , which is the cutpoint the lower court would use if the higher court were fully informed about
the case facts.
Thus, L ’s compliance is increasing in the whistleblower’s
cutpoint, whereas the probability of review after a dissent
is decreasing. The probability of dissent remains zero, and
no actual dissents are observed in equilibrium.
The rightmost region (Region III, cW > c L ) exhibits
partial and diminishing whistleblower effects. Here, the
threat of dissent still induces the lower court to comply
more than it would absent the threat (c∗L (cW) > c L )—
this can be seen by comparing compliance in Regions I
and III. However, on some cases for which L values the
liberal ruling sufficiently highly (x ∈ [c∗L (cW), cW]), it
chooses not to comply even knowing that a dissent will be
triggered. Thus, dissents are observed in equilibrium, and
the probability of a dissent is increasing in the whistle-
blower’s cutpoint. More interestingly, within this region,
more dissenting by W (i.e., a greater cW) has the coun-
terproductive effect of diminishing W’s influence on the
lower court and generating even less compliance (i.e., a
lower c∗L (cW)). This demonstrates that there is a “limit to
dissent” as a tool for effectuating compliance by a lower
court.
The preceding observations have surprising implica-
tions for how a whistleblower’s behavior affects compli-
ance by a lower court.
Corollary 1. When the lower and higher courts are jointly
best-responding, the whistleblowing cutpoint cW thatmaxi-
mizes the lower court’s compliance is equal to c L ∈ (L , H).
Why is reporting of noncompliance on cases beyond
c L not only ineffective for inducing additional compli-
ance, but also increasingly counterproductive? Because
there is always a chance that the cost of review will be
too high for the higher court to review, there is an upper
bound on howmuch the lower court can ever be induced
to comply—this upper bound is c L , or the cutpoint from
the complete information benchmark. For cases to the
right of this cutpoint, the lower court would risk escaping
reversal by the higher court even if H had complete in-
formation about the case facts, because of the possibility
that review would be too costly to be worthwhile. When
W dissents on cases to the right of this cutpoint (i.e.,
when cW > c L ), L simply cannot be pushed to comply
more. As a result, the only effect of this additional dis-
senting is to diminish the informational value of dissent
by lumping more severe instances of noncompliance to-
gether with less severe instances. As characterized in the
next subsection, this lowers H ’s equilibrium beliefs about
the expected severity of noncompliance upon observing a
dissent (i.e., a lowerd(·)), which causes H to respond to
dissents less (i.e., a lower G(d(·))) and ultimately results
in less compliance by the lower court in equilibrium (i.e.,
a lower c∗L (cW)).
The fact that frequent dissenters are less effective is
well understood by members of the judiciary—for ex-
ample, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has warned of the
“danger of crying wolf too often” (Ginsburg 1990, 142),
and Justice Harlan Stone wrote to Karl Lewellyn, “If I
should write in every case where I do not agree with
some of the views expressed in the opinions, you and
all my other friends would stop reading them” (Murphy
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1964, 62). Our model, however, demonstrates a previ-
ously unidentified implication of this effect; excessively
frequent dissenting can actually reduce compliance by a
lower court. The reason is that whistleblowers have both
an ex ante and ex post effect on judicial outcomes. Ex post,
their dissents increase the probability of review. Ex ante,
the threat of their dissents increases the lower court’s in-
centive to comply. If a whistleblower excessively “squan-
der[s] the ammunition of dissent” (Llewellyn, Gewirtz,
and Ansaldi 1988, 1000, fn. 10), she can dilute the effec-
tiveness of that ammunition so much that a lower court
is more willing to rule noncompliantly and risk review.
Formally, increasing the whistleblowing cutpoint above
c L (i.e., to the right in our model) leads to a concomi-
tant shift in c∗L toward less compliance (i.e., to the left).
Substantively, when “friends” (i.e., judges with similar
preferences) stop reading dissents, “enemies” will be able
to ignore whistleblowers’ threats.
EquilibriumWhistleblowing
Having characterized how the whistleblower’s dissent be-
havior affects the lower court’s equilibrium level of com-
pliance c∗L (cW), we now complete the analysis. Specif-
ically, we first characterize equilibrium values of the
whistleblower’s dissent cutpoint c∗W , then describe when
the whistleblower’s presence will affect the lower court’s
equilibrium compliance behavior, and finally derive com-
parative statics in the whistleblower’s parameters.
Proposition 2. Equilibria always exist and satisfy the
following:
1. A pair of cutpoints (c∗L , c
∗
W) are an equilibrium
i.f.f. c∗L = c∗L (c∗W) and
c∗W = min
⎧⎨
⎩(W − ε)
− d
G(d (max{c∗L , c∗W}, c∗W)) − G(nd (max{c∗L , c∗W}, c∗W))
, H
⎫⎬
⎭.
2. There exists an equilibrium that exhibits whistle-
blower effects (c∗L > c L ) i.f.f.
W > c L
+
(
ε + d
G(d (c L , c L )) − G(nd (c L , c L ))
)
.
The first part of the proposition provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for compliance and dissent cut-
points (c∗L , c
∗
W) tobe an equilibrium; the lower courtmust
be best-responding with c∗L (c
∗
W), and the whistleblower
must be best-responding to this level of compliance. The
second part of the proposition states necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for whistleblower effects to occur in
equilibrium—that is, for the threat of the whistleblower’s
dissent to increase lower court compliance relative towhat
would occur absent the whistleblower. The condition is
that W is more conservative than the threshold that is
defined in the proposition. The required threshold is in-
creasing in both the cost of dissent d and the whistle-
blower’s share of the reversal sanction .11
Comparative Statics. Proposition 2 does not rule out
multiple equilibria, which complicates deriving compar-
ative statics. Intuitively, the reason is that dissenting be-
yond the limit to compliance c¯ L can be self-reinforcing;
by decreasing the lower court’s compliance, such dissents
also increase the higher court’s responsiveness to dissent,
and consequently the whistleblower’s willingness to dis-
sent. However, because our emphasis is on how much
compliance can be achieved, for the remaining analysis
we select the equilibrium in which the maximum level
of compliance is sustained; we denote this quantity c˜ L .12
This selection reflects a broader normative interest in in-
stitutional arrangements that align the rulings of lower
courts with the preferences of higher courts.
We now describe how maximum equilibrium com-
pliance changes as a function of the parameters directly
affecting the whistleblower’s willingness to dissent.
Lemma 6. Maximum equilibrium compliance c˜ L exhibits
three consecutive regions as a function of the three param-
eters that directly affect the whistleblower’s willingness to
dissent: her conservatism W, the cost of dissent d, and her
share of the reversal sanction . These regions mirror the
regions associated with c∗L (cW) in Proposition 1.
Thus, the effects ofW,d , andonmaximumequilib-
rium compliance c˜ L are essentially identical to the effect
of the whistleblower’s cutpoint cW on partial equilibrium
compliance c∗L (cW). The comparative statics all exhibit
three consecutive regions: one with no whistleblower ef-
fects, followed by a region with full whistleblower effects,
followedby a regionwith partial anddiminishingwhistle-
blower effects. These results are illustrated in Figure 4,
which is based on a numerical example with L = 0, H =
.8, ε = .8, k¯ = 1,W = .9, d = .04, and  = 0. Figure 4A
depicts how themaximumequilibriumcompliance varies
as W becomes more conservative. Initially, W has no
effect on L ’s cutpoint, and thus there are no whistle-
blower effects (i.e., c˜ L = c L ). Then a more conservative
whistleblower increases compliance until it reaches the
11This is derived by considering whether W would wish to dissent
on any noncompliant caseswhen L uses cutpoint c L and H believes
dissent to be maximally informative (cW = c L ).
12Formally, c˜ L =max{c L s.t. ∃ cW s.t. (c L , cW) are an equilibrium}.
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FIGURE 4 TheMaximum Level of Compliance, as a Function of (A) theWhistleblower’s
Conservatism, (B) the Cost of Dissent, and (C)W’s Share of the Reversal Sanction
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vary in their respective plots. The dashed horizontal lines depict c L and c¯ L .
compliance limit (c L ), at which point increasingW lowers
c˜ L . Figures 4B and 4C depict a similar effect of increas-
ing either the cost of dissent (d) or the whistleblower’s
share of the reversal sanction (). Note that the order of
the regions is reversed for the share of the sanction and
the cost of dissent, since increasing either decreases the
whistleblower’s willingness to dissent.
OptimalWhistleblowing and the “Ally
Principle”
To conclude our analysis, we consider the ideal whistle-
blower from the perspective of the higher court. An in-
fluential organizing idea in the study of principal-agent
relationships is the ally principle, which states that “a prin-
cipal is made best off by appointing as his or her agent
the individual whose preferences over outcomes are most
similar to those of the principal” (Gailmard and Patty
2012, 367). In ourmodel, the ally principle clearly applies
to the relationship between the higher court and the lower
court—an L who is identical to H would always comply.
However, we show in this subsection that it does not gen-
erally hold with respect to the relationship between the
higher court and whistleblowers.
To understand what type of whistleblower the higher
court would want in terms of preferences (i.e., W), we
must first examine the higher court’s preferences over the
whistleblower’s cutpoint (i.e., cW). These preferences are
determined by two factors—his desire for accurate in-
formation about the severity of noncompliance (to min-
imize wasteful reviews), and his desire for the threat of
dissent to induce compliance. However, Proposition 1
implies that these two considerations are at odds: when
the whistleblower’s cutpoint is above the limit to compli-
ance (i.e., cW > c¯ L ), better information about the severity
of noncompliance comes at the cost of further reducing
the effectiveness of dissent for inducing compliance. This
trade-off generates the following result about the higher
court’s preferences over the whistleblower’s dissent cut-
point.
Lemma 7. When the lower and higher courts are jointly
best-responding, the whistleblowing cutpoint cW that max-
imizes the higher court’s expected utility is strictly less than
H and weakly greater than c¯ L .
The higher court thus never prefers that the whistle-
blower fully report all instances of noncompliance. For
many parameter values (including our numerical exam-
ples), the negative effect of whistleblowing beyond c¯ L on
the lower court’s compliance is so severe that the higher
court actually prefers the whistleblower to report non-
compliance only up to c¯ L .
What type of whistleblower would engage in such
optimal intermediate whistleblowing? In general, it is not
a perfect ally of the higher court, in the sense of pref-
erences. Why? Unlike in many setting where costs are
shared between principals and agents, in the judicial set-
ting whistleblowers have the following three properties.
First, they alone pay the costs of issuing dissents. Second,
they also may suffer some of the reversal costs that fall
on the lower court. And third, they are spared the higher
court’s cost of wasteful reviews. For example, a whistle-
blower who shares H ’s preferences but for whom dissent
is cheap will generally dissent too much because she does
not suffer H ’s costs of review.
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More surprisingly, however, the ally principle fails
in our model even when the whistleblower’s and higher
court’s costs and benefits are perfectly aligned.
Lemma 8. When dissent and reversal are costless for the
whistleblower, and the whistleblower internalizes the higher
court’s cost of review, the higher court’s expected utility is
maximized by a whistleblower whose preferences are strictly
less than H.
The failure of the ally principle under these con-
ditions stems from the nature of dissent itself: it can
only occur after the lower court has made its decision.
Consequently, the whistleblower is unable to internalize
the equilibrium consequences of her dissent behavior on
the lower court’s compliance. Instead, she simply dis-
sents based on the immediate costs and benefits, and will
therefore dissent toomuch when her payoffs are perfectly
aligned with the higher court.
As described above, judges themselves do indicate
a concern with the broader consequences of dissent-
ing too much. However, it is unclear whether they can
mitigate their incentives to do so by “tying their own
hands.” Although outside the scope of our model, the
repeated interactions that occur between higher courts
and potential whistleblowers may provide one solution
to this problem: judges may be able to develop a repu-
tation for only whistleblowing in egregious instances of
noncompliance.
Discussion and Conclusion
Like all hierarchical organizations, the judicial hierarchy is
replete with informational asymmetries. Our model puts
these asymmetries front and center to understand how
judges and external actors can simultaneously help higher
courts with limited resources decidewhich cases to review
ex post, and affect compliance by a lower court ex ante.
Our main insights are twofold. First, we show that infor-
mativeness of a fire alarm to a higher court is decreasing
in its frequency; intuitively, the signal of a whistleblower
who saves her warnings for more egregious instances of
noncompliance will be more useful to a higher court, ex
post, because it seeks information that helps it conserve
scarce resources. Second, we show that the decreasing im-
pact of whistleblowing, ex post, can eventually result in
less compliance by a lower court ex ante. Our results thus
illustrate the importance of identifying and connecting
the ex ante and ex post effects of potential whistleblow-
ers. This observation surely applies to organizationsmore
generally, and further theoretical and empirical analysis
would add to our understanding of how whistleblowers
influence decision making in hierarchical institutions.
Once we consider the fact that higher courts oversee
a number of lower courts and potential whistleblowers
with varying preferences and incentives, our model helps
us to understand a set of key empirical regularities about
the federal judicial hierarchy. First, considering judges
themselves as potential whistleblowers, our model illus-
trates how ideological heterogeneity and the institution
of dissent interact to create panel effects on the Court of
Appeals. In particular, the model provides an internally
consistent explanation for why potential dissenters can
sometimes change the votes of their colleagues, but other
times fail to do so and must act on their threat to dissent.
Second, when dissents or other whistles are blown,
theydo increase the likelihoodofdiscretionary review,but
review is far from guaranteed. For instance, the presence
of a dissent or amicus brief increases the likelihood that
the SupremeCourtwill review a case, butmany such cases
are nevertheless not reviewed. This, too, is consistent with
our model—even when the higher court is sure that it
disagrees with a decision, in some cases it will not find it
worthwhile to review the decision.
Third, the effectiveness of the threat of dissent is a
function of how often a potential whistleblower is actu-
ally willing to dissent. Thus, our model also illuminates
why interest groups and the solicitor general are more ef-
fective at getting the SupremeCourt to review lower court
cases, relative to judges themselves. Because both interest
groups’ amici briefs at the certiorari stage and petitions by
the solicitor general are relatively rare (compared to the
hundreds of dissents issued by Courts of Appeals judges
in any given year), such signals are likely to be highly
informative to the Supreme Court.13
Fourth, ourmodel provides a rationale for the relative
differences in the cost of sounding a fire alarm across legal
actors. In the supporting information (section SI-2), we
present an institutional design analysis in which we char-
acterize how the parameters in the whistleblower’s utility
function—including the cost of dissent and its share of
the reversal sanction—would be chosen to maximize the
impact of whistleblowing on compliance. We show that
preserving the informational quality of dissents from ex-
ternal whistleblowers who do not suffer any reversal sanc-
tion requires higher dissent costs than preserving the in-
formational quality of internal whistleblowers who do
suffer such costs. This result helps us to understand why
sounding fire alarms is costlier for actors who are not
13To be sure, the solicitor general’s office is also so effective in trig-
gering reviewbecauseof its skilled lawyers and repeated interactions
with the justices (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005).
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judges, such as interest groups filing amici briefs, than for
judges themselves (i.e., to write dissents).
Finally, taking a step back, most decisions by lower
courts are not accompanied by fire alarms. For example,
the dissent rate on the Courts of Appeals is usually less
than 10%. Our model suggests an explanation for this—
fire alarms are only observed when the whistleblower’s
excessive willingness to sound them diminishes their ef-
fectiveness so thoroughly that a lower court is willing to
risk triggering them.
In addition to unifying existing empirical patterns,
our model also generates nonobvious empirical implica-
tions about the relationship between judicial preferences,
dissents, and higher court review. Existingwork on strate-
gic dissents on the Courts of Appeals theorizes that the
likelihood of a dissent on a three-judge panel should be
an increasing function of the distance between the poten-
tial whistleblower and the reviewing court; a perfect ally
should be most likely to dissent (Blackstone and Collins
2011; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004). How-
ever, as seen in Figure 3B, our model predicts that the
likelihood of a dissent should continue to increase as the
whistleblower becomes even further away from the lower
court majority than the higher court, ceteris paribus.
These divergent predictions could be adjudicated with
existing databases of judicial decision making (e.g., the
Songer database) and current measures of judicial ideol-
ogy (e.g., Giles-Hettinger-Peppers [2001] scores).
With respect to higher court review, the related em-
pirical prediction is that the likelihood of higher court
review following a dissent should be decreasing in the
preference extremity of a whistleblower, ceteris paribus
(see Figure 3C). In other words, a conservative higher
court should be more likely to review a liberal decision
accompanied by a dissent from a more liberal judge than
from amore conservative judge. While existing studies of
discretionary review have emphasized the importance of
dissent (see, e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Perry
1991), the importance of who is doing the dissenting has
been under appreciated. Empirical tests along these lines
would add more to our understanding of how the influ-
ence of whistleblowing extends throughout the judicial
hierarchy.
Finally, our predictions about the relationship be-
tween the preferences of a whistleblower and compliance
are quite subtle. As seen in Figure 4A, there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the ideology of a po-
tential whistleblower and lower court compliance. While
measuring compliance is difficult, ourmodel canbe tested
using the votes of a lower court (combined withmeasures
of preferences of judges across the hierarchy). Our model
suggests that as a whistleblower moves further away from
the lower courtmajority in the direction of amore conser-
vative (liberal) higher court, the likelihood of a conserva-
tive (liberal) vote by themajority should first increase, but
then eventually decrease. It is unlikely that this prediction
would emerge outside a formal analysis of whistleblowing
in the judicial hierarchy.
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